In presenting the idea that anyone can and should have the means to do biology, DIYbio, peoples reactions have been consistently polar. Either they are extremely excited about all the possibilities or fear that this movement could cause an increase in unsafe or even illegal things. Differences in opinion are not exactly a rare thing where science is concerned. In fact I’d argue pretty strongly that they are an integral part of the scientific process. But only when those opinions are based on a strong understanding of the underlying science.
Sadly my experience, after teaching a number of public bio workshops and classes, tells me that most people lack even a basic understanding of biology. On multiple occasions I’ve found myself explaining to fairly well educated people (Phd’s in other science fields even) concepts I thought were common knowledge. DNA’s are not proteins, strawberry ATCG’s are the same chemically as Human ATCG’s, even that we have bacteria in us. This of course is not an argument for there not being any risks associated with DIYbio. One might even say that such a lack of understanding is reason enough to restrict the tools needed to do real biology, lest some amateur accidentally cause harm. Which seems a bit backwards to me. “Don’t teach people how to make fire, because they don’t know how to make fire and won’t understand it”.
I say all this to make you aware of the current state of public understanding of biology and that the majority of fear towards a wider dissemination of the tools of biology, stems primarily from a lack of understanding. And that such a knowledge gap makes the wider public extremely perceptible to misinformation, either accidental or nefarious. Which could result in a backlash towards biology which would be far more harmful than any real risks. It is to combat that hype and detail the actual risks that I am writing this article.
What’s the dual use of a can of spaghetti-O’s.
Dual use refers to products and technologies normally used for civilian purposes but which may have military applications. The idea that the tools to do legitimate biology are the same tools used to develop that if anyone has the knowledge and means to do biology in their garage, then ipso facto anyone would have the ability to do bioterrorism in their garage. Journalists and Biosecurity “experts” usually personify this potential for dual use by telling the tale of the “Garage Bioterrorist”. Sometimes they even spice things up by adding a bit of Synthetic Biology into the mix. “What if anyone had the tools to create a synthetic super pathogen?” It’s a terrifying thought for sure… if you don’t realize that an improperly sealed can of spaghetti-O’s could result in a deadly strain[Clostridium botulinum]. While that probably doesn’t make you feel better. The bitter truth is, increasing access to lab equipment would likely not increase the potential for people to create bioweapons because deadly strains are more readily cultured by miss cooking food.
Mother Nature is really, really good at developing bioweapons.
This is almost always my first thought when people come to me with worries of a rogue bioterrorist using knowledge gained from DIYbio or SynBio to do wrong. The Spanish Flu killed more people than both World War I and II combined, and it only took 3 years. Even today the United States alone spends $10 billion a year protecting itself from Influenza. Overall infectious disease is responsible for 23% of all deaths. So limiting the amount of people with the tools to study disease for fear of some possible attack is a bit like making sure your doors locked while your house is on fire. While this isn’t a direct response to the risks of human created bioterror, I feel it’s important to frame it in light of the real threat to biosafety, Mother Nature.
Biologists know less than they say they know, which is even less than the news says they know.
If the headline reads “Breaking: New Cure for Cancer!”, you can almost always be certain that what actually happened is a scientist found a certain compound or method to be effective in combating a specific type of cancer in a petri dish. Which is really only a very small indicator of a potential real cure. What works in a petri dish doesn’t always (read: usually never) work in an animal model, much less humans. But sadly, plain facts don’t make for exciting news stories, and so things get embellished.
To be fair, researchers are pretty guilty of embellishing the scope of their work as well. If you want to do a study of a specific pathway, it doesn’t hurt your chances of securing funding, to frame it in the light of “looking for a cure”. In any case, all the hype leads to an over-inflated opinion of what biologists can actually do; with the full support and backing of a university and funding agency. So when you read a story reporting on what scientists have done or are capable of, either positive or negative, it’s essential to read it with a heaping mountain of salt.
Biology is complicated. Bombs are not.
Even if by some means, some “bad actor” is able to develop a novel virus or bacteria that works well in the lab, the second they release it into the wild there is no guarantee it will have the effect they want, if any at all. There is nothing stopping evolution from simply turning their super virulent and pathogenic vector into a more fit non-pathogenic strain. It’d be impossible to effectively trigger, predict, much less control the outcome of a bioweapon. Where as a bomb is easy to build, the materials can be sourced from any hardware store and the outcome is predictable.
Tl;DR: People are actually inherently Good.
In pitching people the idea of Brightwork, giving ANYONE access to the tools needed to create cures for diseases. One of the most consistent worries brought up by potential investors was “How will you keep people from using the lab to for wrong doing?”. At one point someone even suggested I put a video camera in the wet lab. I just stared at them, completely dumbfounded and I almost snarkily asked them where one buys video cameras with objectives strong enough to differentiate good/bad vectors. But instead I explained that an open lab, works the same way all labs work, on trust and some level of proper safety protocols. Protocols designed to protect from accidents, not some terroristic threat.
I’ve met thousands of people interested in doing biology and hundreds actively researching, and almost all are motivated by two things: scientific curiosity and the desire to have a positive effect on the world. In 50 years, when technology progresses to the point where general access to the ability to create bioweapons becomes a viable threat, I will feel much safer in that distant future if all research and technology is shared openly. Because most people want to do good, and when that “Synthetic Super Pathogen” is created wouldn’t you want as many people as possible with the ability to create a cure for it?
EndNote: If you are interested in reading more about legitimate and real biosafety and biosecurity concerns, I strongly recommend reading The UNICRI’s “Security Implications of Synthetic Biology and Nanobiotechnology” It is by far the most thorough and factual writing on the subject. [for some reason the public version is abridged]. As well the wilson center just released a report detailing the “Myths of DIYbio” that is worth a read.